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if the jury had a reasonable doubt of that fact, they must
acquit, and the result is well known; see pamphlet report of
Sickles' trial, p. 106. Such is now the general inclination of
the American authorities: see Polk v. The State, 19 Indiana
170; Chase v. The People, 40 Illinois 352; The People v.
Garbutt, 17 Michigan 9, where an able opinion by CooIY,
C. J., may be found; Ropps v. The People,29 Illinois 383, qualifying the earlier decision of Fisher v. The People, 23 Illinois
293. Massachusetts has made one more advance in the right
direction, in the case of Commonwealth v. Heath, 11 Gray 303,
1858, holding that when the defense is idiocy, an originaldefect
and want of capacity, the burden of proving competency is
throughout on the government, notwithstanding the presumption; but leaving it still an open question whether the same
rule applies to derangement, alienation or disease of mental
faculties; but it seems that the logical application of the doctrines of .AfcKie's case, so generally approved in that State,
leaves no escape from the full adoption of the position herein
advocated, when a proper case shall arise for adjudication:
see Andrews' trial, p. 258.
In conclusion, therfore, may we not assume that reason,
analogy and the better considered modern authorities all concur
in declaring that the burden of proof in criminal cases never
shifts upon the defendant to establish affirmatively the fact of
his insanity, but that if upon the whole evidence, on both sides,
the jury have reasonable doubts of his sanity, they cannot convict, and therefore must acquit?
E. H. B.
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Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
GARTIN AND OTHERS V. PENICK AND OTHERS.
L In 1857, Penick conveyed to Chandler and others. in trust for the use of
the "Bethel Union Church," several acres of land in Marion county, on which
that church, then affiliated with the New School organization of Presbyterian.
lsm, erected a new house of worship.
Nealy a year after this conveyance of 1857, the members of the "Bethel
Union ' unanimously joined the " Old School" organization.
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The deed of 1857, duly acknowledged and recorded, was burnt, with the reIn 1863. In 1865, Penick, withoutauthority, conveyed
cords of the clerk's office,
the same house and land to other trustees for the use of the "Behel Union
Church, adheringto the General -Asserably."

In 1867, Penick, and about half the members of the church adhering to the
General Assembly, claimed and asserted the right to the exclusive use of the
church property, whilst Gartin and the other members protesting against certain deliverancesof the General Assembly, asserting the like right to the church
property, proposed, as a compromise, an equal and alternate enjoyment of the
property.
The Circuit Court, in this suit, adjudged to Penick and his associates the exclusive use of the church property; and Gartin and his associates, claiming in
the court below the right to an equal and alternate enjoyment of the nburch
property, appealed from that decision. Reld-First.That by invoking It both parties acknowledged the jurisdiction of the
civil power of the State.
Second. A church, like every other organized body of citizens, must be consolidated by an organic law, and under and according to the Constitution of
the United States.
Third The organic law of the Presbyterian Church is a fundamental compact, voluntarily made between all Its membersof the unincorporated association, for the guidance and protection of each constituent church and member,
and necessarily inviolable, by any delegated power of the aggregate church.
.burllh. The Presbyterian Church is certainly as much bound as Congress by
the Federal Constitution, and all its members are subordinate to that and the
State constitutions, which are supreme over all citizens in every condition.
.flh. So far as civil rights and duties are concerned, the civil government
has supreme authority to rule; and to that extent every citizen of every grade
and condition owes a paramount allegiance to that soverelgnty, and is recipro.
cally entitled to Its protection over all other human power.
Sbth. Civil tribunals have jurisdiction over controverted claims to the use
of church property both In England and in this country.
2. While the general desire of courts of law is to avoid ecclesiastical or spirItual questions, they find it impossible wholly to do so. If a body of men have
wrongful possession of a church or of a sum of money on the pretense, for
example, that they are the religious body to which the money or the building
was de-tined, their opponents have no way of redressing the wrong and vindi° eating their own rights, except by appealing to the civil tribunals of the con.
try; and civil tribunals have no means of doing justice, except by investigating
Into the differences of doctrine, discipline or practice, which, to the litigants,
may be religious differences, but to the judge are mere matters of fact bearing
on a question of civil right.
3. The contract under which the two antagonistic organizations In this case
claim, ispurely civil, and not ecclesiastical; and the usufructuaryrights result.
ing from it depend on the laws of the land, and not on the arbitrium of the
General Assembly of the Church, which has no civil power. Penick's conveyance of 1857 is the only legal document of title to the church property, and it
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conveyed the property simply to the church without regard to its external
connections with the Old School General Assembly, but only as a Presbyterian
orgaunization. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that the beneficiary was
then attached to the New School.
4. Tke fact that, some time after the conveyance of 1857, the members of that
united church unanimously left the New and joined the Old School, did not
either affect their identity, or, per se, subject their property to the jurisdiction
of the General Assembly, or change their tenure of it, so as to make it depend.
ent on adherence to that council; and
5. According to this conclusion the appellants, Gartin and his associates, are
entitled to participation in the use of the dedicated property.
6. If the appellants held their interest in the church property by the tenure
of adherence to the General Assembly, a severance of that connection by the
unauthorized acts of the General Assembly cannot affect the title to the pro.
perty. They are still, in every essential element of identity, the same "Bethel
Union Church" as always heretofore. There might be more reason for saying
that the General Assembly had lost its own identity.
7. The only valid title was passed by the deed of 1857, which contained no
condition of adherence to the General Assembly; and the reorganized church
of appellants, Gartin and others, called "Bethel Union," not having lost Its
essential identity, as now organized in a church capacity, have a right to use
the property of the "Bethel Union" church; but whether the appellees,
Penick and others, are entitled to any use, is not decided on the issue made
between the litigants, whereby appellants claim only half of the use, as stipulated by compromise.

The opinion of the majority of the court was delivered by
ROBERTSON, J.-[After discussing the facts of the case,
which sufficiently appear in the head-notes.]
We cite the following cases only: Craigdaltie's case on an
appeal from the Scotch Session to the British House of Lords,
Paton's Appl., Rep. VI. 626; Galbraith v. Smith, 15 Shaw
808; the Kirkintillock case, 12 Dunlop 523; Forbes v. Eden,
by the House of Lords; Dunbar v. Skinner, 11 Dow's Appl.,
Rep. These cases establish for Great Britain the jurisdiction
of civil tribunals over controverted claims to the use of church
property, and throw light on the boundary of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In the first case in which civil jurisdiction was recognized by the House of Lords, Lord ELDON said that there was
no doubt that, if an estate be conveyed to "trustees to be used
for the purpose of religious worship, the courts of the country,
acting on the principles of toleration, will enforce those persons to permit the property to be used for the purposes of that
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religious worship to which it was devoted." And in most of
the cited cases the court assumed that, to settle the title in
cases of schism, the faith and'doctrines of each class of conflicting claimants may be considered incidentally for identifying the true beneficiaries, but not Tor revision of their creeds
on the question of comparative orthodoxy.
If these be sound doctrines in a country where there is an
established church connected with the civil power, and where
Presbyterianism is non-conformity, and therefore unpatronized
and only tolerated, they must be, as often adjudged, sound
here, where all forms and denominations are equally protected by the civil power, and unconnected with it.
Without more elaboration we conclude that our jurisdiction in this case is sufficiently established by policy, principle
and authority.
This conclusion is perfectly consistent with the constitutional
freedom of religion, the true interests of the Presbyterian
Church and the rightful and peaceful authority of its General
Assembly; and the faithful exercise of the political and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as thus defined, without the assumption
of more by either power, would harmonize religion and poli.
tics, liberate the Church and the State from strife and entanglement with each other, aid civil liberty and promote the concord
and purity and righteous progress of the Church itself.
The opposite course would soon, even in this tolerant coun.
try and liberalized age-as always hitherto and elsewhereadulterate the Church, jeopard the peace and stability of the republic, and lead to an unhealthy consolidation which would
degrade both the civil and ecclesiastic power from the lofty
and self-poised position which they once mutually maintained.
The second question to be now considered is less important
but more difficult than the first just disposed of inthis opinion.
Whether the appellants or appellees, as now constituting separate churches, are entitled to the exclusive or alternate use of
the property claimed by each party, depends on the essential
identity of one or both of them with the Bethel Union Church,
to whose use that property was dedicated.
"While the general desire of courts of law is to avoid eccle-
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siastical or spiritual questions, they find it impossible wholly to
do so. If a body of men have wrongful possession of a church
or of a sum of money, on the pretense, for example, that they
are the religious body to which the money or the building was
destined, their opponents have no way of redressing the wrong
and vindicating their own right except by appealing to the
civil tribunals of the country; and civil tribunals nave no
means of doing justice except by investigating into the differ.
ences of doctrine, discipline or practice which, to the litigant§,
may be religious differences, but to the judge are mere matters
of fact, bearing on a question of civil right."-" The Law of
Qreeds of Scotland."
From the pleadings and proofs the judicial deduction is inevitable that the appellants and appellees, as now organized,
constitute separate and antagonistic churches, each claiming to
be the church to which the property in litigation was dedicated; and, consequently, the question now to be decided is one
of identity, involving in its solution the equitable title to property dependent on contract, which this court must, when, as in
this case, appealed to, interpret and uphold as well between ecclesiasticalbodies as civil bodies or any other parties. The contract
is purely civil and not ecclesiastical,and the usufructuary rights
resulting from it depend on the laws of the land, and not on the
arbitrium of the General Assembly of the Church, which has
no civil power, but within the limits of the political and eccle.
siastical constitution, has supreme and final jurisdiction over
church doctrines and discipline. The jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals over church property does not, therefore, conflict with
the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Assembly in the plenitude of its ecclesiastical power, either legislative or judicial.
Without interfering with religious liberty, this court could not
control or mould the faith or doctrines of the Church; nor
could it, consistently with the spirit of our institutions, authoritatively settle questions of orthodoxy or optimity among pro.
fessing Christians. But so far as the identity of the respective
claimants with the beneficiary to whom the church property
was dedicated may be affected by their doctrines or by thf.
Acts of the General Assembly, the essential coincidence of the
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doctrines and the legal effect of those acts must necessarily be
considered for the purpose of deciding the question of title to
the property, without concluding the General Assembly, in any
way, in its own proper jurisdiction in its ecclesiastical domain.
This is no interference with vital Christianity, but leaves .it
free and undisturbed by the civil power, and may check its
intermeddling, as an organic power, with civil and political
rights as individual citizens, whether in or out of the Church,
might rightfully do.
The pleadings and preponderating evidence authorize the
judicial deduction that Penick's conveyance of 1857 is the only
legal document of title to the church property, and the conclusion also that it conveyed the property simply to the church,
without regard to its external connections with the Old School
General Assembly, but only as - Presbyterian organization;
and this last conclusion is fortified by the fact that the beneficiary was then attached to the New School separatists from
the Old School of Presbyterianism. It appears that the appellants, as now organized into a distinct church, independent of
that of the appellees, both styled "Bethel Union," still adhere to the same doctrines and observances which characterized the "Bethel Union Church" at the date of that conveyance; while the appellees recognize the ultimai e supremacy of
the General Assembly over their church and its property, and
the duty of all subordinate churches connected with that
headship to submit to all its ordinances and other acts of
administration. Then the appellants constitute the identical
church to whose use the deed of 1857 dedicated the.property,
although they do not adhere to the General Assembly, but
stand independently of it, as the same church, including the
appeilees, did when the deed was made.

The fact that some time after that conveyance the members
of that united church unanimously left the New and joined the
Old School, did not either affect their identity, or, ver se, subject their property to the jurisdiction of the General Assembly
or ehange their tenure of it so as to make it dependent on adhe.
rence to that council. According to this conclusion, the appellants, as a distinct church, are entitled to participation in the

--

--
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use of the dedicated property; but whether that right be exclu.
sive or only alternate, we are not required to adjudge in this case.
But the appellees assume that when the deed of 1857 was
made, the members of the then undivided Bethel Union, attached to the New School party, contemplated a junction with
the Old School, as afterward, in less than a .year, accomplished; and that, therefore, they expected to hold the property
on condition of adherence to the General Assembly, and are
as much subject to that contingent tenure as they would be
had the deed itself so provided. The hypothesis is difficult
to maintain on this record. But its truth would not, though
presenting a new phase, essentially affect the title to the
church property, because, as we shall now proceed to argue
and adjudge, unconstitutional Acts of the General Assembly
detached the appellants.
From their first connection with that council until the
churches as well as the States had become distracted by the
late civil convulsion, the members of the Bethel Union Church
had been signally blessed by Christian fraternity and concord,
and without disturbance, harmonized with the General Assembly; but the stultifying passions excited by that revolutionary
commotion developed a general demoralization, as contagious
in our ecclesiastical as in our political councils. In the rapid
progress of moral deterioration, Congress and the General
Assembly, each representing the Union section of the bellige
rents, seemed to co-operate, pari passu, in proscribing the
revolting section and its sympathizers everywhere,, and each
body assumed undelegated powers, especially for enforcing
"loyalty " and the abolition of slavery. Antecedently to that
elemental war, fanatical abolitionists had, by premature and
lawless disturbance of that domestic institution of many of
the States, frenzied the popular mind andjeoparded the Union;
and many professors of Christianity had sympathized with
them in their reckless crusade, in defiance of the prophetic
warnings of the most eminent and philanthropic of American Christians and statesmen.
[The history of the controversy is given at great length,
but want of space compels us to omit it.]
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There were then in Kentucky six Presbyteries, one hundred
and sixty-three churches, one hundred and eight ministers,
and nearly twelve thousand members of the Presbyterian denomination; and of these, only thirty-two ministers, twentyeight churches, and about eighteen hundred members, adhered
to the General Assembly; and the residue, constituting a very
large majority, unwilling to submit to what they held to be
unscriptural and unconstitutional orders of the General Assembly, united on the "Declaration and Testimony". platform, and were, for this heroic recusancy, and for imputed
insubordination and contempt, irregularly exscinded without
trial. A recital of all the intermediate proceedings by all
parties is deemed useless in the decision of this case. They all
betray the same nusanctified temper.

The appellees, submitting to the General Assembly, and
recognizing its asserted powers, continued under its assumed
jurisdiction; but the appellants, uniting with the non-conformists, reorganized themselves as the Bethel Union Church,
under the auspices of the excommunicated party. These
conflicting communities of a dissevered church no longer
communed together, but by amicable arrangement each
party occupied the house of worship on alternate daysthe appellants on the first and third, and the appellees on the
second and fourth Sabbaths of each month; but finally, the
appellees, claiming the exclusive use of it, attempted to exclude the appellants altogether; and this litigation is the
monstrous offspring of that unrighteous conflict.
"The Declaration and Testimony" was neither insubordinate
nor contemptuous, unless it be insubordinate to act according
to religious conscience, and contemptuous to vindicate the act
by decent argument and bold appeal to the Bible, to the example
of the Founder of Christianity, and to the principles of the
(Ionstitution of the United States, and of that of the Presby
terian Church founded expressly on the revealed will of God,
all of which are supreme over the will of the General Assembly.
Entertaining the opinions and principles which remonstrants
professed, they not only had a moral and constitutional right to
protest. as they did, but would have been guilty of recreance
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from their sacred duty had they, by servile submission to i
false notion of the infallibility and supremacy of the Assembly.
sacrilegiously stifled conscience, and prostituted religioa at the
shrine of usurped power. Right or wrong in their sentiments,
they preferred the martyrdom of excommunication to hypocritical recantation and unconscientious co-operation in what
they felt to be a wrongful perversion of free religion to an illicit
connection with turbulent politias, and thereby adulterating
both civil and ecclesiastical government; but for this manifesto
and a consistent adherence to it, the Assembly renounced all
connection with them. This it had the constitutional power
to do, without civil remedy for any abuse of that mere power.
Nevertheless, if its acts which were complained of were un.
constitutional, and therefore void, the expulsion cannot affect
property which the civil tribunals are bound to protect. Then,
were any of those acts unconstitutional? We think that they
were demonstrably so. But we deem it sufficient to illustrate
this conclusion by the deliverances of 1864-'5 on loyalty and
slavery. These, at all times, would have been unauthorized
interferences with civil affairs; but the crisis aggravated their
flagrancy. The seceding States asserted the doctrine of paramount allegiance to the individual States; the non-seceding
claim it for the Union; and this conflict of radical principles
was an efficient cause of the insurrectional war. This difference
in theory was not less sectional than the war itself. Each
section denounced as treason what was loyalty in the other;
and even in the Union sections there were various notions of
loyalty to the National Government. While many rightly
considered devotion to the Constitution as the only true loyalty, a majority treated it as disloyalty when not subservient
to all the acts of the Federal administration, constitutional or
unconstitutional, right or wrong.
The sentiment on the subject of slavery was also essentially
sectional, and was the proximate cause of the war. One party
donsidered it a sin, and, treating it as a crime, advocated its
extinction at any time, under all circumstances, and by all 2possible means. Many of the pro-slavery party tolerated it as
legal, and others considered it a providential blessing to the
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black race, bj translating barbarous and hopeless Africans to
America, where they were rescued from the worst form of
slavery, and secured from the doom ofsacrifice, always imminent
in their native country, and were gradually civilized and
christianized for their own exaltation and for the regeneration
of their fatherland. They also thought that, when the white
and black races co-exist on the same territory in such relative
proportions as in this country, the security of both races
required the subordination of the black to the white race, and
that such subordination could not be secured otherwise than by
slavery in some form; that, in the providence of God, those
races are immiscible without great deterioration of the Caucasian blood and degradation of society; that the Union
would never have been formed had not its architects conceded
to each State the exclusive right to control all its domestic
relations; and that, therefore, the Federal Government had no
right, in any mode, to interfere with the institution of slavery; that the abolition of slavery, to be tolerable, must be
spontaneous and gradual; and that the immediate and forcible
emancipation of four millions of slaves would be a greater curse
to both races than American slavery could be felt to be by
any considerate abolitionist; and this was the opinion of
Henry Clay, a life-time emancipationist, and also of Abraham
Lincoln, who, though zealously anti-slavery, yet, nottwo weeks
before the promulgation of his emancipation proclamation, published that he had no power to abolish slavery, and that if he
had, he would not do it suddenly or forcibly, which he would
apprehend as a greater evil than slavery itself.
Now, whatever may have been intended, the deliverances of
the Assembly on loyalty, which it defined as co-operation with
the government in whatever it might do, and on the abolition
of slavery at once, and even by servile war, must have tended
to widen the breach, aggravate and prolong the war, and retard
restoration; andthere canbe no candid pretense for saying that,
by this conduct so inflammatory and inopportune, the General
Assembly did not try to guide civil affairs, and unconstitution.
ally intermeddled with vital questions in all-absorbing politics.
We will not debate so plain a question. The inevitable
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conclusion is, that the General Assembly itself forced the
dismemberment of the Presbyterian Church by acts which are
void for want of higher authority; and consequently, even if
the appellants held their interest in the church property by the
tenure of adherence to the Assembly, a severance of that
connection by the unauthorized Acts of the Assembly cannot
affect the title to the property. They are still, in every essential
element of identity, the same "Bethel Union Church" as always
hitherto. There might be more reason for saying that the
General Assembly has lost its own identity. It is certainly not
what it was always before the civil war. * * * * Judgment
reversed and decree for the appellants to pass in, the court
below, to enjoy the use of the church one-half the time.
The foregoing is certainly a case of
very considerable general interest,
an involves one question at least
which is fundamental to the very existence of even the semblance of
church discipline in our country, so
far as the right to hold or enjoy the
use of property is concerned. Chief
Justice WrLukZxS concurred in the
result, but dissented from the grounds
and reasons assigned for the judgment. And, if we fully comprehend

immorality." This word "immoraliy"
here must, we suppose, have its ordi.
nary interpretation, as being what is
,na~um in se, as opposed to ma/um
prohibitum. And we suppose few per.
sons, unless their patriotism runs
very high, so as to bewilder their
reasoif and Judgment, would be prepared to claim that disloyalty to the
National Government, which consisted
only in an abstract opinion that the
rebels were in the right, during the

the precise state of the case, it seems late civil war, out of regard to a

to us we should feel compelled to
agree with the Chief Justice. There
does not seem to have been much
difrence of opinion among the
Judges in regard to the law, but only
as to its application to the -facts in
this particular case.
The statute of Kentucky provides
that in case a schism or division
shall take place in a religious society, "the trustees shall permit each
party to use the church a part of the
time, proportioned to the numbers of
each party;" and also, that the "excommunication of one party by the
other, shall not impair such right, except it be bona fWe, on the ground of

claim of higher allegiance to the State
Government than to the National Gov.
ernment. could be regarded as anything more than a violation of positive law. In order to become macum
in se. or actual sin, it must be shown,
we suppose, that the individual knew
and recognized his paramount alle.
glance to the National Government.
For any, one to seriously claim that
to be true of the great body of the
insurgents, or of every other person
not of their number, must argue either
great stupidity or else wonderful self.
conceit. It would seem, therefore,
that under this statute the appellants
were clearly entitled to the use of the
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church their proportion of the time,
notwithstanding their exclusion from
zhe main body. And that is all
which they claimed, and all that it
seemed necessary to decide in the
case, and, in fact, all that was decided, and to this extent the court
seemed to have agreed in opinion.
And it seems rather to be regretted
that the cause should not have been
determined upon this narrow, but
obvious ground. We had a sad iilustration of the bad effect of courts
discussing abstract questions not indispensable to the decision of the particular case, in the bred Scott case,
and it is certainly to be hoped we
may exercise more discretion in future
in that respect, both in State and national tribunals.
But since the whole field of the
doctrines and disciplinary powers of
Christian churches in this country
was so fully and so largely discussed
in this case, both by the majority and
the minority of the court, it is surely
not improper for us to suggest briefly
what we regard as the sound and safe
rule upon the subject, as there can
oe no such duty of reticence upon
mere journalists as upon the judges.
We do not understand that any such
presumption in favor of the jurisdiction of these church Judicatories exists, as in the case of the superior
courts of general Jurisdiction in the
State or nation; but on the contrary,
everything requisite to create the jurisdiction must be proved affirmatively by any who claims the benefit
of their action, as in the case of courts
of limited and summary powers
within the State, or of all foreign
courts, as church courts surely may
he regarded. But when this is shown
we uppose the judgment of church
courts and assemblies are as concin-

sive as those of any other tribunal
It is like the case of a reference or arbitration. The submission, whether
immediate or remote, whether by a
contract for the express purpose or
by a contract of membership, is all
the same, but in some way it must be
proved. If there was an agreement
to submit, and the party had the opportunity to be heard, which his submission stipulated, and the decision
was upon the matter submitted, and
was honest and bona fide, there can
be no question-the matter is concluded, as much as by the judgment
of any civil court.
There is, no doubt, a wide range of
debatable ground in regard to questions affecting the jurisdiction and
the procedure of church Judicatories;
and as their minutes of their proceedings have not the force of judicial
records orof written evidence, but only
of oral proof, there is not the same in.
fallibility or absolute verity about
their judgments or decisions which
attaches to the judgment of domestic courts of record. These proceedings are more analogous to those
of foreign courts, where the proof is
all open to be encountered by mere
testimony en pais, before the Jury,
the same as any contract, resting
merely in parole. But the record of a
foreign court, although not here accorded the same absolute verity as
a record of a domestic judgment,
Is, nevertheless, a written docu.
ment to be proved by copy; but
that is not true of the minutes of
church courts. But no one principle
or proposition upon this subject seems
better established in the jurisprudekce
of this country than that no civil
court can undertake to revise the pro.
ceedings of ecclesiastical courts upon
the merits, and sit, as a superior court
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ot appeals or court of error upon
their proceedings. We are not aware
of any more than one case-Sith v.
Ndeso , 18 Vt. 511-which gives the
slightest countenance to any such
doctrine. It is declared, over and
over again, in different States, that
the decisions of ecclesiastical courts,
within the range of their ju isdiction,
and while passing bona fide upon matters of strictly ecclesiastical cogni-

It must then be shown that the pro.
ceeding was regular. In the case of
an arbitration, that the hearing was
upon the very matter submitted, neith.
er more nor less, and that the par,
ties appeared, or having had ample
notice that the hearing was had with.
out appearance, in pursuance of the
provisions of the submission; or in
the case of ecclesiastical courts, that
the party was duly warned to appear,

zance, are as conclusive upon the
rights of the partiet, and as binding
upon the civil tribunala as the judgments of any other tribunals, domestic or foreign. This is the rule declared in Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush
82, 898, after devoting nearly seventy
pages to the examination and discussion of the subject and the cases. The
same view is affirmed in Shannon v.
.fost,3 B, Mon 261; Gibson v .Armstrong, 7 B., Mon. 481; Den v. Bolton,
2 Green, Oh. 22; Am. Primitive Sodety v..Pellings, 4 Zab. 659; German
Reformed Churches v. Seibert, 3 Penn.
St. 291; Butter v. Dutch Reformed
Church, 6 Wright 503; Commonwealth
v. Green, 4 Wharton 599; Robertson v.
Bullions, 9 Barb. 134.
But as we have before said, the
mere decision of a court of summary
jurisdiction, or of an arbitration, or a
foreign court, is not even prima facie
evidence of its binding obligations
upon the parties. Something more
must be shown, because the law does
not pronounce in favor of the juris.
diction or of the regularity of the
proceedings. These must be shown
before any such decision becomes obligatory. The case of an arbitration
will well illustrate the whole subject.
The submission must be shown, or in
the case of an ecclesiastical court, that
the persons and the subject matter
come within the range of its control.

and did appear, or absented himself,
with the knowledge that according to
the rules of procedure in such courts,
the matter would be .heard without
his appearance or in his absence.
A person, by becoming a member
of any ecclesiastical organization, submite to be bound by their regular proceeding and bona fide determinations.
And to this extent, and this only, are
their judgments revisable by the civil
tribunals: First, That the subject-matter is of ecclesiastical cognizance, and
Second, That the hearing and judgment were regular, according to the
settled bourse of such trials, and that
they were bona fide, honest and sincere. Thi§ may be well said to afford
but sliglt protection to those who are
so unfortunate as to fall under their
censure, since men, in matters of this
kind, are proverbially wanting in all
the essentials of impartiality and fairness.
That Is most unquestionably true In
regard to all party questions, both in
Church and State, and indeed in all
questions which become partisan,
whether of religion, politics, morals or
philosophy. Men seem sometimes to
lose all candor and fairness, and to be
driven on by a kind of blind rage to.
ward one only end-the upholding
of their own party views and interests, regardless alike of the merits of
the case or the consequences to others.
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But there is no other mode of determining these questions except by the
judgment of the very men who constitute the body of the organization,
so vitally interested in them. But in
the majority of cases, perhaps, there
Is no such degree of inflammation in
the public mind in regard to the questions involved as to produce any in.
vincible obstacle to reaching the truth,
or some reasonable approximation toward it. And when the question in.
volved is of such public interest as to
place the majority of men beyond
the reach of argument or reason, and
thus produce what writers on medical
jurisprudence call the clearest evidence of monomania, viz.: That the
individual refuses to yield his delusions to the clearest argument or reason; in short, ceases to be capable of
reasoning upon the subject; whenever the question to be determined
becomes of this exciting and absorbing character, it may just as well be
determined by the ecclesiastical as by
the civil tribunals. For a partisan
judge is just as likely to be found in
one place as in the other, and is
equally incompetent either to reason
upon the subject or to be reasoned
with. And when the question is of ecclesiastical cognizance, and the parties have been fully heard, and the
case Is honestly determined by the
best lights which the minds of the
triers were capable of receiving, it
is proper that it should be regarded
as inal
If that were not so, the civil tribunals would find enough work to give
them constant employment, in supervising the affairs of churches and
triendly societies. And this would be
so with6nat attempting, as some civil
tribunals have recently felt it their
duty to do the still more laborious

process of controling the proceedings
of ecclesiastical courts by way of injunction, while the matter was still
sub Judice, which has not, until very
recently, been claimed to come within
the range of judicial supervision, and
which, we trust, will not hereafter find
much countenance.
It now remains to inquire how far
the point in dispute in the present
case was properly concluded by the
decision of the ecclesiastical judicatories. It seemsto be admitted on all
hands, that the appellants had been
cut off from the main body of the organization by an act of discipline,
claimed to be an excommunication,
and that the proceedings were in all
respects regular, unless the ground
of the excision was one not coming
Justly within the range of ecclesiastical discipline, viz.: Disloyalty to the
National Government.
This is, unquestionably, a point in regard to
which fair-minded men might entertain different views. There are, no
doubt, some grounds, or supposable
grounds of excommunication, which
would so clearly indicate a want or
fairness and good faith in the church
authorities, that the civil tribunals
could not regard them as boia=
de
and honest opinions or decisions, and
would, therefore, feel bound to dLsregard them; as if a man should be
excommunicated for want of good
clothes, or a fair complexion. It is,
perhaps, supposable that a majority of
a Christian church might become so
deeply impressed with the sanctity
of their own political opinions, or
their theories upon health and die.
tetics, as to honestly believe it to be
their duty to excommunicate every
member who did not conform to their
party opinions. This might, or might
not, Indicate bad faith. We do not
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suppose any such thing will be likely time, from holding the.property. Vice
to occur just at present, but there Chancellor MALTNS here states a most
have been some intimations in regard- notorious fact in England, that "in
to the Immorality in the use of alco- progress of time, many of the original
gradually
hoUe drinks and of tobacco, that Presbyterian congregations
becoming
some
views,
their
changed
it
that
would prepare us to expect
not
might, possibly, in some wild crusade Independents, others Baptists, and
upon the subject, be made a condition a few became Unitarians;" and the
of church membership, that one should same things have occurred in tb
wholly abstain from all such debasing country in numerous instances.
It seems to us, the only practicable
practices. We are by no means sure
the thing may not already have been course for the courts in this country
attempted in some very advanced lo- will be to adopt the same course, subcalities; and if it should become com- stantially, which was pursued in the
mon, and the process of excommuni- case last cited, and treat the action of
cation be based upon these grounds, the churches, according to their own
it seems to us it might present some constitutions and canons, as binding
very embarrassing questions for the 'the members, so long as the proceedcivil tribunals to determine. We ings are regular and bona fide. 'If
should scarcely be prepared to advise not, they will not, of course, bind any
an appeal to the civil tribunals; for one; and whether they have been so,
one of the vice chancellors in Eng- is always open to inquiry, as matter
land has quite recently determined a of evidence in pas, the same as in requestion in regard to the right of a gard to an arbitration or a foreign
dissenting congregation to hold pro- judgment.
We have already sufficiently ihdiperty devised to the ministers for the
beneit of the -Presbyterians," at a cated our own view of the proper
particular town or place, which seems grounds upon which this case should
to us to deny all right to inquire have been placed, and there is cerinto the doctrines or discipline of the tainly not yet sufficient liberality and
donees in such cases. This was the fairness in thepublic sentiment, either
south, to allow of the satiscase of Attorney GeneraZ v. Bunce, north or
of the main quesdiscussion
factory
gift
the
where
563,
Law Rep. 6 'Eq.
General Assemthe
which
upon
tion
was confessedly to trustees, for the use
to exscind a majority of
fit
saw
bly
as
congregation,
of a Presbyterian
need be said
such. There was no question that the its membership. All that
It seemed. to be one of
that
is,
here
made
and
Presbyterian,
a
was
donor
fairly
the bequest to assist that form and those questions which come
It
mode of worship, and that for many within the discretion of that body.
poa
mainly
was
it
that
said
be
may
years after the gift the congregation
was exclusively of that character; litical question, and one upon which
in opinion, and
but for the last sixty years or more good jurists differed
definitely setit had become mainly Baptist, and its which could only be
and that
war;
of
event
the
by
tled
The
Baptist.
been
also
ministers had
make right:
court held that this would not pre- might does not always
clude the continuous organization, and that the proceedings of the Gen.
which had come down to the present eral Assembly were intended mainly
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for political effect.
All this, and
mnuh more of the like kind, may be
said, and may be true, but it does not
seem to us to destroy the jurisdiction
of church assemblies for considering
it, and making it a ground of discipline, if they deemed that expedient
an:l prudent.
Kentucky continued
through the conflict a member of the
Union, and an integral portion of the
National Government. The practical
allegiance was, therefore, due to that
government. The citizens and subjects, therefore, of *that government
had no right to do anything, or indeed to say anything, which would
tend to strengthen the enemy or withdraw support from the lawful government. Allegiance in such a case is,
no doubt, matter of positive law, and
while it might be absurd to attempt
to punish one for holding as mere
matter of opinion, his paramount allegiance due to the State instead of

the nation; yet while it was practi.
cally maintained that the nation was
supreme, a we understand the fact
was throughout the conflict in the
State of Kentucky, it seems to us it
was the duty;of a good Christian "to
submit to the powers that be, as ordarned of God, for the punishment of
evil doers and the praise of them that
do well." And U1 the churches attempted to enforce this duty by excommunication, it does not seem to us the
civil tribunals have any ground of
interference or any power to set aside
their decrees.
Perhaps we ought to say of the case
of Smith v. ielson, 28 Vt. 511, that
it reversed our own decree as chan.
cellor, and it might naturally be ex.
pected that we would still hold the
opinion of the chancellor as being the
better law, as the court in Kentucky
seems to have done.
L F. I.

Supreme Court of PennsyZvania.
MOORE V. GREEN AND COATES STREETS PASSENGER RAILROAD
COMPANY.
A debt created by award is not founded on any contract or lending, and is
therefore not within the statute of limitations.
Where the act of incorporation of a railroad company provided that before
commencing to use the street the company should purchase the stock, etc.,
of an omnibus line, at a price to be assessed by three disinterested persons
chosen as the act provided, the assessment of the price by such persons was
not an award but an appraisement based on the contract of the parties, and
was therefore within the statute of limitations.

ERROR to the Court of Nisi Prius.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-The Act of Assembly- of March 27, 1713,
"An Act for limitation of actions" (1 Smith's Iaws 76), copying the words of the statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, enacts that "all
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actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without

specialty," shall be commenced and sued within six years next
after the cause of sach action or suit, and not after. It was
held in Hodsden v. Harridge,2 Saund., Rep. 64 b., that an
action of debt on an award was not within the statute. The
award indeed, in that case, was under seal, but as it was in
pursuance of a parol submission, that circumstance was not
regarded as material. By a later statute of 3 and 4 William
IV. c. 42, all actions of debt upon an award, when the submission is not by specialty, shall be sued within six years: Billing's Law of Awards 213. This court, however, followed the
English construction of the statute in Rank v. -Hill,2 W. and
S. 56, though it would seem with much hesitation, and simply
on the ground of authority, for it is said in the opinion "one
would suppose the submission to be an engagement to abide
by what the arbitrator should direct and a promise to perform
it." We have no statutory amendment of the law, as they
have in England. We must hold, then, that a debt created
by award is not grounded on any contract or lending; conse.
quently, that an award upon even a parole submission is not
within the act.
The question which we are now to decide is, whether the
cause of action as set forth in the first and second counts of the
declaration is a debt created by an award, or, on the other
hand, is grounded on a contract without specialty. There is
no material difference between the first and second counts in
the statement of the cause of action. Indeed, it is evident
that the pleader, by any variance in the mode of statement,
could not have avoided the question which arises. The counts
are both properly drawn, in strict accordance with that which
the facts of the case only warranted.

These counts are, in

substance, that the defendants accepted their charter, conferring upon them the franchise of carrying passengers for hire
on and along Green and Coates streets, with the condition precedent, that before commencing to use the said streets they
should purchase, at the option of the owners, the stock of
horses, omnibuses, sleighs and harness owned and used upon
said streets, at a price to be assessed by three disinterested
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persons, to be chosen in the manner provided in the Act of
Incorporation, who should appraise the said stock; that the
defendants accepted the charter, and commenced the road September 5, 1858 ; that three disinterested persons were selected
to assess the price, who did appraise the said stock November
23, 1858, wherefore a cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs
to have and recover from the defendants the amount of the appraisement, with interest thereon. We may dismiss entirely
the, consideration of the third.count, because the jury have
found a verdict for the defendants on the other pleas as to
that count. It is now immaterial whether the plea of the
statute would have been a good answer to that. Each count
in a declaration is, in law, the statement of a separate and distinct cause of action, and pleas, though put in generally to the
whole, are to be applied severally to each count. It is true,
no doubt, that if the statute was not a good plea to either the
first or second counts, the judgment on the whole record must
on the demurrer be for the plaintiff. As we have seen, however, there is no substantial difference between them.
A contract is an agreement upon consideration between two
or more persons to do or not to do a particular thing. Then
there undoubtedly was a contract. The plaintiffs were to exercise their option of selling their stock, which they did, as the
first count expressly, and the second impliedly, avers, other
wise it would have been bad. The defendants had, of neces
sity, a similar option of purchasing, which they did, as averred,
by accepting the charter and commencing the road. There is
the aggregatio mentium-all the essential elements of a contract. If so, then the action must be held to be grounded on
a contract without specialty. By specialty is meant an instrument under seal. That one of the terms of the contract---he
price-was to be ascertained in a mode provided by a statute,
does not alter the nature of the case. It has been held, therefore, that the Act of Limitation is a good plea in an action by a
justice of the peace for his fees: Hains v. Christian,10 Barr
233. There a statute fixed conclusively the price of the services rendered by the justice. The plaintiffs could never have
succeeded on a bare count on the assessment on what they term
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the award, without averring, as they have done, the exercisu
of the option by both parties-in other words, the contract.
In an action on an award to go back and set out the cause of
action, which was submitted to the arbitrators, would, manifestly be improper, surplusage and immaterial, if not bad. An
award is the judgment of a tribunal selected by the parties to
determine matters actually in variance between them; not
merely to appraise and settlc the price of property contracted
for under the stipulation that this term of the contract.was to
be so ascertained.
Had the parties made the contract and
afterward, on a dispute arising, chosen arbitrators to determine what was due upon it, that might have been. an award.
The case is entirely different where the parties originally agree
to buy and sell at a sum to be fixed by an appraisement to be
made by a third person or persons. When the original contract is established by competent and sufficient evidence, then
indeed the assessment thus made by the authority of the parties, or by authority of law, as in the case of the justice of the
peace, may be conclusive as to the price, but there is nothing
in the transaction to conclude the parties as to anything else
They may fall back, dispute the existence of any contract at
all, or prove that it was tainted with fraud or illegality.
Here is the clear and palpable distinction between such an
appraisement and an award, which, as the court say in Rank v.
Hill, "seems to be considered rather as a judgment than as an
agreement of the parties made through the authorized agency
of others." The case before us was in no sense a judgment, but
simply an agreement through the authorized agency of others.
Such an appraisement has been held not to be an award within
the stamp laws: Leeds v. Burrows, 12 East. 1; Perkins v.
Potts,2 Chitty 399. In Sybray v. White, 1 M. and W. 435,
a written verdict of a miner's jury, who were to determine
whether the defendant was possessed of a certain shaft of a
mine, by the agreement of both parties, was held not to require
a4 award stamp. The document, though in the nature of an
award, and strong evidence against the defendant, was not considered as an award in fact or conclusive in evidence as an
award would have been, and the jury were looked upon rather
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as accredited agents than an arbitrators: Russell on Arbitrations 243. So a monthly settlement between partners in a
stage coach business, made by a person named in the agreement, who was to settle what was to be paid and received
monthly by each partner, was held not to be an award requiring a stamp as such: Carrv. Smith, 1 Davidson and Merivale
192. Nor is such an appraisement subject to the strict rules
governing arbitration and awards: K lly v. Crazqford,5 Wallace (S. 0.) 785. It would not be necessary that the appraiser
should decide upon evidence heard in the presence of the parties. They could decide, and, indeed, would be expected tofix,
the value of the articles, upon their own knowledge of the subject, though doubtless theymight seek information from other
quarters. We think, therefore, that the statute of limitation
was a good plea to the first and second counts of the declaration. The determination of this question adversely to the
plaintiffs renders unnecessary the consideration of the other
assignments of error.
Judgment reversed, and now judgment for the defendants
on the demurrer.

Supreme dourt of Missouri.
JAMES LAFFERTY AND OTHERS V. THE ST. JOSEPH R. R. CO.
The "fence laws," which make a railroad company liable for injury to cattle,
etc., on their track, where there is no fence, whether the company be negligent
or not, contemplate injury from direct and actual collision.
Where cattle or horses on the track are frightened, and in running or jumpingout of danger are injured, but there is no coUison with the locomotive or
cars, the railroad company is not liable.

This was an action for damages, and asking for the statuory
penalty. The petition in substance stated that plaintiff's
horses got on the track of the defendant's railroad, where it was
not fenced, and where there was no road crossing, and while
so on the track, they were frightened by the cars and engines
of the defendants, and in getting off the track of said rail
roai, they were injured.
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The Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to this petition, and
oi! appeal to the District Court, the decision of the Circuit
Court was reversed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNER, C. J.-The only question requiring consideration
is the true meaning and proper construction to be placed upon
the 43d section of chapter 63, statute 1865.
That section declares that every railroad corporation formed
or to be formed in this State, and every corporation formed or
tu be formed under that chapter, shall erect and maintain good
and substantial fences on the sides of the road where the same
passes through, along or adjoining enclosed or cultivated fields,
of the height of at least five feet, with openings and gates or
bars therein, and farm crossings of the road fbr the use of the
proprietors or owners of the lands adjoining such railroads;
and also to construct and maintain cattle guards at all railroad crossings where fences are required as aforesaid, suitable
and sufficient to prevent horses, cattle, mules and all other
animals from getting on such railroad. The section further
provides that until such fences, openings and gates or bars,
farm crossings or cattle guards shall be duly made and mainTained, such corporation shall be liable in double the amount
of all damages which shall be done by its agents, engines or
cars, to horses, cattle, mules or other animals on said road.
There was no collision on tlhe road, and the animals were not
injured by any actual contact, but being on the track of the
road, they were frightened by the train, and, in running, hurt
themselves while jumping off the track. There is an admissionin the record that where the accident occurred the road was
not fenced or enclosed, as required by statute, and in such case
negligence is an inference of law, and the defendant will be
held liable absolutely, without regard to that question, if the'
injury happened or the damage resulted in a manner contemplated by the above section.. In Indiana they have a statute on
the same subject, differing somewhat in phraseology from ours,
but in substance and effect identically the same. In a suit
under that statute, the plaintiffbrought suit for injury done to a
mare. The facts were that on the sound of the whistle on the
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approaching train, the mare ran on the track before the train
until she came to a culvert, and then jumped so as to clear the
culvert, and fell on one side of the track. In falling, her left
fore leg was broken, and she was otherwise injured. She was
not touched by the locomotive or any part of the train. Upon
these facts the court decided that the statute contemplated a
direct injury. That its words should be "killed or injured by
the cars or locomotive, or other carriages," etc., imparted the
idea of actual collision, and that it would notbe consistent with
the intent of the act to give them such an exposition as would
cover a case of consequential damages: Te Pe R. 1?. Co. v.
Haskett, 10 .fnd. 409.
Redfield, in the last edition of his work on railroads, quotes
the foregoing case as authority, and lays down the rule that the
liability of a railroad where the companyhas failed to fence, as
required by statute, does not extend to animals injured by
fright: 1 Redf. on Railroads 493, pl. 14. Hilliard says if a
horse takes fright at the noise of a train not caused by any unusual or unreasonable operation, the company is not liable, and
to sustain this position he cites Burton v. Philade1phia,etc., 4
Harring. 252; Bordentown v. a'mden, etc., 2 Harr. 314.
These cases, to which reference is made, are not accessible at
this place, and we have had no opportunity of examining them.
The same author also refers to the case in 10 Ind.as settlingthe
law that a statute making railroad companies liable for injuries
to domestic animals, whether negligent or not, does not apply
to an injury from fright where the animal is not touched: 2
Hilliard on Torts 378, pl. 46.
The counsel for the plaintiff relies strongly on the case of
Mosher v. Utica and Schen. R. R. Co., 8 Barb. 423, but that
case seems to have been directly overruled in Coy v. the same
defendant, 23 Barb. 643, and neither of the cases have any
particular bearing on the question we are now considering.
The statute was passed not exclusively for the benefit and
protection of the owners of stock, who were liable to suffer
loss and damage, but also as a police regulation for the safety
of passengers and the traveling public, who are exposed to
dangers and peril in cases of collisions. This court recently
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quoted, with approbation, the remark of the New York Court
of Appeals, in Ernst v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9,
on a kindred question, that the failure of a railroad company
to comply with its statutory duty to give the proper signals
at the crossings of a highway, was a breach of duty to the
passengers, whose safety is imperiled, as well as to the wayfarer, whom it exposed to mutilation and death: Rohbuck v.
Packc B. B., 43 Mo.
In construing the statute we must examine the whole object
which led to its enactment. The words are that the company
shall be "liable in do*uble the amount of all damages which
shall be done by its agents, engines or cars, to horses, cattle,
mules or other animals on said road." It seems to me plain
that a direct or actual collision was contemplated. That when
the agents of the road run the locomotive or cars against any
animal, and thereby injured it or in any other manner it was
hurt by actual contact or touch, then the company should be
responsible for the penalty, otherwise not. I am, therefore,
of the opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court should
be reversed.
The other judges concur.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
THE PEOPLE EX RELATIONE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL V.
SALOM!ON.
A statute passed under the forms of law is binding upon all public minista.
rial officers, and obedience win be enforced by mandamus.
A citizen whose rights are effected by such statute has the right to test its
constitutionality by appropriateproceedings in the courts, but a public minis.
terial officer has no such privilege; his official duty is to obey the law.
A party who has by his own illegal acts put obedience to a mandamus out of
his power, but neglects to returnthat fact in his answer to the alternative writ,
so that the court, in ignorance of it, issues a peremptory writ, is liable to pun.
Ishment for contempt in not obeying the latter writ.

Onthe 14th of October, 1867, the auditor of public accounts,
in obedience to law, gave notice under his official seal, to the
defendant as clerk of the county court of Cook county, that
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the State board of equalization had raised the assessed value of
theproperty in that county, for the purpose of taxation, twentyfour per cent., and thatit would be the duty of such clerk to
extend the taxes on the collector's books according to such
increased valuation. This the defendant declined to do, on the
assumed ground that the equalization law was unconstitutional;
and at the January term, 1868, of this court, the auditor applicd to the Supreme Court for a mandamus commanding the
defendant to extend this tax. To the alternative writ the
defendant made a return setting up the unconstitutionality of
the law as a reason for not obeying it, but not disclosing the
fact that the tax books had already been delivered by him to
the township collectors. The case was heard by the court on
the return to the writ, and argued by counsel, when, on the
10th of February, 1868, a peremptory mandamus was awarded,
this court holdingthe equalization act to be constitutional. At
the present term of this court the Attorney General filed an
information, giving the court to be informed that the defendant
had not obeyed the peremptory mandamus.
Upon this information this court awarded an attachment for
contempt, and the defendant being brought before the court
thereon, the Attorney General filed a series of interrogatories,
to which defendant responded under oath. The answers were
admitted to be true.
The defendant being in court, the judgment was delivered by
BREESE, C. J.-We do not deem it necessary to pronounce
in detail upon all the items of your several answers to the
interrogatories. Your answer to the secondinterrogatory, considered with the others, disclaiming all intentional disrespect to
the mandate of this court, embodies your defense to this pro-.
ceeding, the substance of which answer is, that so soon as the
peremptory mandamus was served upon you, on the 11th of
February, 1868, you obtained the advice of eminent counsel,
the tenor of which was, that you should, forthwith, demand of
the several collectors a return of the tax books then in their
possession, so that you might make thereon the taxation, as
commanded by the writ.
That you ascertained, on application. to the county treasurer,
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that the collectors of the twenty-eight towns outside of Chicago
had returned the books to him; that you demanded of the treasurer the books that you might comply with the order of this
court, and that he refused to deliver the books to you, giving
as a reason that the law required him to retain the possession of the books for the purpose of collecting the taxes then
remaining unpaid, and for making out his delinquent list, and
for making application to the proper court for judgment upon
it; and that he could not return the books until after the tax
sale in the month of September following.
That you called upon the collectors of the towns of North,
South and West Chicago, informing them that you had received
the -writ of mandamus, and demanded of them their books for
the purpose of extending upon them the additional twenty-four
per cent., and that they severally refused to deliver the books
to you, giving as a reason for such refusal that the warrant&
attached to the books required them to collect the taxes as
thereon extended, and to make return of the books to the
county treasurer by the 15th of May following, and also that
they had given heavy bonds for the performances of that duty.
That you suggested to the auditor, on informing him of
these facts, that as a means of overcoming the difficulties in
the way, the best course would be to extend this additional tax
on the books of 1868 as "back tax," to which the auditor did
not assent.
That upon learning this non-assent of the auditor, you proposed to the chairman of the board of supervisors the propriety and necessity of making out new books, extending on
them this additional tax; and that the chairman informed you
that it was necessary, as he understood the law, that he should
sign the warrants attached to such books, as chairman of the
board of supervisors, in order to their validity; and that he
would not sign such warrants if you did make up new
books; and that thereupon you again consulted your legal
adviser, and he informed you that if the chairman of the board
refused to sign the warrants attached to the proposed new
books, they would be illegal and useless, and that behad grave
doubts whether, if the chairman should sign such warrants,
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they would be valid; as he understood the command of the
writ of mandamus, it was that the additional tax should be
extended on the original books, and therefore could not advise you to take the labor and expense of so doing.
That the collector's books were not returned to your office
until the last of October or first of November, 1868, which was
some time after the tax sale, and whilst you were engaged,
with all the force of your office, in making up the collector's
books for that year, when it was too late, under the law, and
impracticable and impossible, in any point of view, for you
to extend the taxes in the books of 1867, and collect the same.
That when you were engaged in preparing -thebooks for the
collection of the taxes of 1868,you consulted your adviser as to
the propriety of extending this additional tax on those books as
"back tax," and his opinion was that it would not be legal,
and might invalidate the whole levy of 1868; and that he was
of the opinion there was no other way to collect that tax but
by the enactment of a special law by the legislature.
That in pursuance of that opinion you visited the seat of
government during the session of 1869, and urged upon several
of the members from Cook county the necessity of the passage
of a special act for levying and collecting this tax; but for
some reason unknown to you, such an act was not passed.
The foregoing embraces the merits of your defense to this
proceeding, and which you claim purges the contempt with
which you stand charged.
The substance of your return is, that you had returned the
books to the tax collector, and could not re-possess yourself
of them for the purpose of extenaing the additional tax.
We have carefully considered this return, and, in our judgment, it is, as a justification, open to serious objections.
The first is, that this fact existed at the time the alternative
writ issued, and should have been embraced in the return of
that writ, in order that the court might have disposed of the
case on a full knowledge of all the facts, and have so shaped
its proceedings as to suit the emergencies of the case as it
then actually stood.
Instead of that, you submitted the case to the court upon
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the theory, that the books were still in your hands, or subject
to your control, and thus, by your withholding the fact upon
which you now rely for a jusification of your alleged contempt, the court was compelled to make an order which you
now say it was impossible for you to obey.
The court was not unaware that the time for the delivery of
the books to the collector had expired, but as the proceedings
were solely for the purpose of compelling you to extend the.
tax, and you did not profess it was not in your power to do
so, or that you had parted with control of the books, the
court, in making its final order, acted upon the case made by
yourself and for yourself in the record.
But the main objection to the sufficiency of your answer is,
that you are endeavoring to excuse your disobedience to a command of the court, by setting up your own previous disobedience to a command of the legislature, you are seeking to
escape the consequences of one wrongful act by pleading that
you have committed another not less wrongful. This species
of defense is, in our judgment, forbidden you by that universal principle of law which forbids a party to avail himself of
his own wrong.
This maxim lies at the very foundation of jurisprudence, and
is applied alike in civil and criminal proceedings. The statute
requires you to do a certain act; you refused to do the act,
and when the agencies of the court are set in motion, by the
proper officers of the State, to compel you to do it, you seek to
escape obedience to their commands by alleging that you so
acted as to render their power ineffective, and at the same time
make yourself safe in your disobedience by consummating your
illegal act before the court had spoken.
To allow this sort of defense to be made as a justification
for disobeying the peremptory writ, would be to set all law at
defiance and make the mandates of this court a by-word and
a jest. Your duty was to extend the tax on the 15th of October, 1867, when the-books were in your possession, so that
the tax might have been collected by distress, or by the sale
of the real property of the delinquents.
The dilemma in which you. are now involved is the conse-
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quence of your failure to do this precedent act, which would
have assured the collection of the tax at the time provided by
law. It would be unjust, therefore, should you be permitted
to shield yourself from responsibility in this proceeding, you,
yourself, having created the circumstances by which you were
disabled from obeying the mandamus.
The law under which the additional tax was imposed had
passed the legislature under all the forms of the Constitution,
and had received executive sanction, and became by its own
intrinsic force the law to you, to every other public officer in
the State, and to all the people. You assumed the responsibility of declaring the law unconstitutional, and at once determined to disregard it, to set up your own judgment as superior
to the expressed will of the legislature; asserting, in fact, an
entire independence thereof. This is the first case in our judicial history in which a ministerial officer has taken upon himself the responsibility of nullifying an act of the legislature for
the better collection of the public revenue-of arresting its operations-of disobeying its behests, and placing his own judgmeit above legislative authority expressed in the form of law.
To the law every person owes homage, "the very least as needing its care-the greatest as not exempted from its power."
To allow a ministerial 6fficer to decide upon the validity of a
law, would be subversive of the great object and purposes of
government. For if one such officer may-assume infallibility,
all other like officers may do the same, and thus an end be put
to civil government, one of whose cardinal principles is subjection to the laws. Being a ministerial officer, the path of
duty was plain before you. You strayed from it and became a
volunteer in the effort to arrest the law, and it was successful.
Had the property owners who were subjected to this additional
tax, considered the law unconstitutional, they could, in the
proper courts, have tested the question, and it was their
u-doubted right to do so. Your only duty was obedience.
The collective will of the whole people was embodied in that
law. A decent regard to them required that all their servantsi
should obey it. Your disobedience being the cause of your
inability to obey the mandamus, cannot, as we have said, be
made a justification of this proceeding.
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In coming to a conclusion in this case, our attention has
been arrested by a part of your answer to the third interrogatory of the Attorney General, wherein you say that by the
action of the financial committee of the board of supervisors,
about the 15th of October, 1867, in directing you not to extend
the additional tax, and by the almost unanimous direction given
by the board of supervisors by resolutions passed at the following December session, to the same effect and purpose, a
public sentiment and feeling was created against its extension
that continued after the issuing the writ of mandamus, and
was very embarrassing to you.
This leaves your conduct exposed to the inference that, as a
public officer, charged with the performance of an important
duty, involving, in some degree, the welfare of the State, you
desired to interpose the advice and determination of other
county officials, who were under no responsibility whatever in
the particular case, and that you would invoke an excited
public opinion to justify a dereliction of duty.
You certainly were not unaware that every person who
obtains public office takes it with all its responsibilities, and
voluntarily comes under a pledge to the constituent, that they
shall be fully met and promptly disclarged. No public officer
should shrink from the performance of a duty imposed by law
because public sentiment may be opposed to the law. To sustain a plea that he was deterred from action by an excited
public opinion would put an end to civil government. There
can be no brighter exhibition of the moral sublime than a persistent performance of duty unswayed by popular clamor and
undismayed by threats of popular vengeance. However much
an angry crowd of to-day may denounce the officer, the sober
second thought of to-morrow will as loudly applaud.
Upon a calm review of the whole case, as presented by the
record, the law would not, in our opinion, be properly vindicated, should we pass over your official delinquency by an
admonition only. We feel compelled, under a controlling sense
of duty, to do something more, to omit which might operate
as encouragement to others. The court, therefore, in view of
all the circumstances, have come to the conclusion that you
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make your fine to the people of the State of one thousand
dollars; audit is further considered that you stand committed
until the fine and costs are paid- It is further ordered that
the clerk of this court receive and receipt for this fine for the
benefit of the treasury of the State.
Had the writ of mandamus reached you while the books
were in your possession, and had it been made known to this
court that you had refused to extend the tax upon them, we
should not have hesitated to inflict upon you the severest
penalty. As it is, we are satisfied we could do no less than
we have done in vindication of the law.
The duty this court has been called upon to perform has
been by no means a pleasant duty. We have endeavored so
to discharge it that whilst asserting the supremacy of the
law, we have not causelessly invaded any individual right.

Court of Common Pleas of New Yorkc.
MACLUT V. NEW JERSEY STEAMBOAT COMPANY.
A common carrier may make reasonable regulations as to the place where
the baggage of a passenger shall be deposited, and if actual notice of the regulation Is given to him, or it be shown that the regulation had become, by general usage, so notorious and universal thathe must be presumed to have known
it, the passenger violating it cannot recover for loss of his baggage.
Posting a printed copy of the regulation In carrier's conveyance or office,
does not amount to notice to the passenger. He Is under no legal obligation
to read such notices.
A passenger on a steamboat who carries his valise with him to his stateroom, does not thereby undertake the exclusive care of it, so as to release the
carrier from all liability in regard to it.
The placing of his valise in his state-room by a passenger who has paid his
fare and received the key of the room, is sufficient delivery to the carrier to
charge him for negligence.
A regulation that would prevent a passenger, who was to spend the night on
a boat, from taking to his state-room the baggage necessary for his toilet and
for his daily use, would not be reasonable or valid.

This action was brought'to recover of defendants, owners of
a line of steamboats running between New York and Albany,
the value of a quantity of baggage, consisting- of articles of
wearing apparel lost on board of one of defendants' vessels.
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On the trial it was claimed by defendants that they were
exonerated from all liability for loss, on the ground that the
baggage was deposited by the passenger in his state-room, and
not delivered to the custody of the defendants or their agents;
that notices were posted throughout the vessel prohibiting passengers leaving their baggage in their state-rooms, and that it
must be presumed that the passenger in this case saw such
notices and had knowledge of this regulation. The passenger
admitted not having delivered his baggage to the defendants or
their agents, but denied any knowledge of such regulation. The
defendants' counsel requested the court to charge, that in order
to make defendants liable, the baggage should have been committed to the care and custody of defendants; that a carrier may
require portion of baggage, not necessary for daily use, to be
deposited in a suitable place, as a baggage-room; that defendants were not liable for wearing apparel in present use and in
the custody of a passenger; that if common care and attention
on the passenger's part would have prevented loss, he cannot
recover; that it would be negligence if the passenger did not
make use of the facilities placed by defendants at his disposal
for protection of his property; that defendants did all in their
power to protect the passenger's property; that to render
defendanis liable, there must either be a special acceptance of a
passenger's baggage by them, or a delivery to them according to
the established usage of business. The court refused to charge as
requested. Exception was taken by defendants to the portion of
the judge's charge, wherein the court charged that with reference to contract of passage between the passenger and defendants, there was no obligation, on passenger's part, to read any
notice limiting defendants' liability, but that if such notice was
brought home to him in any way, it bore upon the question of
negligence only, and that if the jury believed that the passenger was guilty of negligence in not reading the notice, and
in taking his baggage in his state-room with knowledge of
such regulation, then that he could not recover. A verdict
was rendered for plaintiff, from which defendants appealed.
Prentice folu appellant.
Haclin for appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAILY, First Judge.-A carrier of passengers has the right
to establish any reasonable regulation which he considers necessary to secure the safety of the baggage of his passengers, and
if the passenger knows of the regulation, and his baggage is
lost through his negect or refusal to comply with it, the carrier is not answerable: Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner 221;
Hall v. Power, 12 Met. 482; Ball v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 1
Daly 491; .fudget v. Bay State Steamboat Company, Id. 158;
Van Horn v. Kermit, 4 E. D. Smith 453 ; Angel on Carriers,

§§ 530, 530 a, 530 b. This has been, from the time of Coke,
held to be the law in respect to the liability of innkeepers
for reasons that are equally applicable to the carriers of passengers: Caley's case, 8 Coke R. 33; WIson v. Halpin, 1
Daly 496; Sanders v. Spencer, Dyer R. 266, b; 'Fan Wyck- v.
Howard, 12 How. P. R. 147; Burgess v. Clement, 4 M. & Selw.

306; .Richmondv. Smith, 8 B. & 0. 9. But to impose that
responsibility upon the passenger, notice should be given to
him of the regulation, or it should be shown expressly that
he knew it., or that it had become, by general usage, so notorious and universal that he must or ought to have known it.
Where the proprietors of a steamboat have, as the defendants
had in this instance, an express place for the keeping of baggage, known as the baggage-room, a regulation that passengers
should not leave their baggage in their state-rooms, or only such
baggage as might be required for their use during the passage,
would not be an unreasonable one. The defendants' witnesses
testified that a large printed notice, entitled "Rules and Regulations to be observed upon this Steamer," had been conspicuously posted up in different parts of the boat, and that a small
copy of it had been put up in each state-room, in the most
prominent part, beside the looking-glass, where the light would
fall upon it. Among other regulations embodied in this instance
was one in these words: "Baggage not allowed in cabins or
state-rooms. This company will not be liable for baggage
unless checked." Their witnesses also testified that there was
but one general entrance to the state-room saloon. That at the
foot of the stairs leading into the saloon, a man was placed,
16
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whose duty it was to prevent passengers carrying valises upstairs; that at the head of the stairway there were servants in
attendance to give notice to persons coming up with baggage,
and that upon the day in question there was a man at the bottom of the stairs leading into the saloon, charged with the
duty.
All this may have been done, and yet if the passenger, U3 he
said, knew nothing of the regulation, the defendants were not
released from their liability. He not only so testified, but that
he carried his valise up-stairs, and that there was no one at the
bottom of the stairs who said anything to him about baggage,
nor any person on board nor in the state-room. He further
testified that there was no such notice as the defendants' witnesses testified to, in the state-room or any part of the vessel.
That he traveled every summer upon boats of this line, but not
on that boat before, as that was her first season; that he had
seen no such notice at any time upon the boat; that having
studied law, he looked for this notice, because he thought that
the company ought to have notified the passengers about their
baggage and about taking care of it; that it was "simply intuition on his part." In addition to his testimony, a passenger,
who was on the boat on that night, was called by plaintiff, and
he testified that it was his impression that there was no such
notice upon the boat; that he would not swear positively that
there was not, but would swear positively that he had not seen
it, and could not remember whether he had looked or not, but
it was his impression that the passenger whose valise was lost
called his attention to the fact that there was no such notice
upon the steamboat. He also testified that he had frequently
traveled upon the boat and taken baggage to his state-room,
and that he had never been forbidden to do so by anybody, and
That he had seen passengers with their baggage up-stairs.
The question whether the passenger had or had not knowledge of this regulation was upon this evidence a question of
fact, upon which the jury have- found against the defendants. If
the case rested simply upon the facts sworn to by the defendants'
witnesses, they would probably have been sufficient to infer
that the passenger must have been apprised of the regulation,
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or rather to liave warranted that presumption in the absence
of any evidence to the contrary. But there was evidence
directly to the contrary, and the question therefore was one
which the jury alone could pass upon.
It remains, therefore, only to consider whether the judge
erred in refusing to charge any of the propositions which were
submitted to him, or erred in those portions of his charge to
which exceptions were taken. The passenger had engaged a
state-room several days before, and upon the day in question he
went to the office upon the boat, got the key of his state-room
and paid his fare. The contract for his passage was-therefore
complete, and the carriage and safe keeping of-his baggage, was,
on the part of the defendants, a duty incident to the contract.
The taking of his valise with him into the state-room was not
such a taking of it into his own exclusive custody and guardianship as to absolve the carrier from any duty, liability or
obligation respecting it: Miulget v. Bay State Steamboat Co.
1 Daly 151; Tower v. Utica, &c., 1. B. Co., 7 Hill 47;
Burgess v. Clement, 4 M. & S. 306; Robinson v. Dunmore, 2
B. & P. 47; Cayle's case, 8 Coke, R. 33; Richards v. The
London, &c., Railway Co., 7 Com. Bench 859; Redfield on
Carriers, § 73; Angel on Carriers, § 140, 143. Assuming this
to be the law, it disposes of many of the requests to charge. It
disposes of the first, for the passenger having paid his fare and
taken his valise into the state-room, it was whilst there, in the
language of the request, committed to the care and safe keepof the defendants, if the passenger, as the jury must have
found, knew nothing of the regulation.
This was substantially determined in Cayle'scase, 8 Coke 33,
and held to be settled from the time of the Year Books, 2 Hen.
VI. 21; 11 Hen. IV. 45; 42 Ed. I1. 11.
The defendants were not entitled to have the fourth request charged, as there was no evidence of any nutice to the
passenger that the baggage not required for necessary daily
use, should be deposited in a "designated place; the printed
notice being, that baggage was not allowed in the cabins or
state-rooms, without any discrimination as to what might be
necessary for daily use. The valise which the passenger ,laced
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in the state-room contained nothing but wearing apparel for a
week's journey, and the articles which atraveler carried for daily
use, a razor and strop, comb and brushes, etc., so even if this
had been the notice, I think the law would hold that the few
things which the valise contained, for beyond the toilet articles
named there was simply what would suffice for a change of
apparel, came under the designation of articles for daily use.
What has been already said is a sufficient answer to the fifth
request. In respect to the sixth there was no evidence of any
negligence on the part of the passenger.
He placed the valise and his umbrella in the state-room and
locked the door, and when he came back five minutes afterward they were gone. They were probably stolen by some
person who obtained access to the state-room by means of the
window, or by opening the door with a duplicate key or pick.
There was no foundation, therefore, for a proposition which
implied the want of common care and attention on his part. It
is no excuse, says COKE in Cayle's case, "for the innkeeper to
say that he delivered the key of the chamber door to the guest
in which he is lodged, and that he left the chamber door open,
for he ought to keep the goods and chattels of his guest in
safety, without any stealing or purloining," and if this was
good law in respect to an inn, it is equally so in respect to the
description of steamboats in which the traveler is carried,
lodged and fed, which may, with some liberty of speech, be
called a traveling inn.
The eighth re-juest was without point or meaning, unless the
facilities were named which the defendant had placed at passenger's disposal for the protection of his property. The judge
did not know what facilities were meant, nor do I. His attention, therefore, should have been drawn to the portion of the
evidence upon which the defendants relied as a foundation
for this proposition, for without this it was unintelligible.
The ninth request should not have been charged. Carriers of
passengers are, as respects the carriage of the passengers'
baggage, which is an accessory to the principal contract, held
to the same responsibility as common carriers in general. and
must answer for the the loss of it, though it happened without
their fault: Hawkins v. ffomnan, 6 Hill 589.
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As is the case therefore with common carriers, they are not
allowed to show that they took all possible care of it-Dale v.
Hall, 1 Wils. R. 281-but are insurers against everything but
the act of God or public enemies. The tenth request that there
must be a special acceptance of the property or a delivery
according to the established usage in the carrier's business, is
disposed of by the fact that the passenger paid his fare, received
the key of the state-room and took his valise there with him,
and in respect to the eleventh request the defendant had the
full benefit of it in the judge's charge.
The first exception" to the judge's charge is his statement to
the jury that the passenger is under no obligation whatever to
read any notice that may be posted in a conspicuous place. It
is well-settled that common carriers cannot affect or limit their
responsibility by putting up notices: Hollister v. Nowlen, 19
Wend. 234; Camden, &c., R. R. v. Belkmap, 21 Id. 35-;
Olark v. Faxton, Id. 153; Power v. Myers, 26 Id. 594; Alex-.

ander v. Greene, 2 Hill 9; 7 Id. 533, and this being the case,
it is not obligatory upon the passenger to read them. They may
be employed by the carrier as a means of bringing to the passenger's knowledge any reasonable regulation, but it does not
follow from this that it is obligatory upon him to read all such
notices, for if we were to hold that, we would have to hold that
whether he read them or not, it being obligatory upon him to
read them, he would be chargeable with the knowledge of their
contents, and this is further than the law has ever gone. All,
therefore, that the judge could be understood as saying was
that the passenger was not obliged to read them in the sense
of being answerable for a knowledge of what they contained,
where he had the opportunity to read and neglected or omitted to do so, which was not, in my judgment, erroneous.
The other exception is to the observation of the judge that
f the notice was brought home to the passenger, that it did
not affect the contract of carriage, that it bore with some degree
of importance upon the question of negligence, and it was only
in this respect that it was of any importance in the case. This,
as an isolated proposition, might possibly mislead, but it could
not do so in this case, for the jury were told in the commence-
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ment of the charge that the case depended principally upon the
question whether notice of the regulation had been given to the
passenger, and after the observation excepted to had been made,
the judge stated to the jury in what respect the knowledge of
the notice was of importance, that is, that it was for the jury to
say whether the passenger, if he knew the regulation, was not
guilty of negligence in allowing his things to remain in the
state-room. But that was notall. He told them further that
if the notice was put up in the state-room it might or might
not be negligenoe on his part not to read it, and he left it for
them to say, if it was posted up, whether he was guilty of negligence in not reading it. adding the observation that if he
was guilty of nogligence in not reading it, he could not recover,
as he must be free from contributory negligence; so that the
previous observation in connection with what followed it,
amounted to about this, that the contract for carriage was
made by the payment of the fare and by the delivery of the
key of the state-room to the passenger, but if the jury thought
that he was guilty of negligence if he knew of the regulation
and did not conform to it, or if he did not read the notices if
one was put up in the state-room, that he could not recover,
which was putting the case even stronger for the defendants
than I think they were entitled to. The carrier-s liability for
the loss of baggage arises from the obligation and duty which
is imposed upon him by law from the public nature of his calling and is not necessarily founded upon the contract, for an
action for the loss of baggage may be brought by a servant,
though the contract for his passage may have been made with
the master who engages for it and pays the fare: Alarshall v.
York, &c., Railw., 11 0. B. 655; Grant v. Newton, 1 E. D.
Smith 95; Hall v. Cheney, 36 N. Hamp. 26.
In conclusion I will add that if it were necessary, I should
feel disposed to hold that even if the passenger knew of this
regulation it would be no infraction of it for him to take the
valise, in view of what it contained, into the state-room with
him. As I have said, it contained little else than a'change of
apparel, two shirts, two drawers, two pantaloons, etc., and the
ordinary articles that a man uses to make his toilet. The
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defendants' witnesses testified that it was customary under
this 'regulation for the passengers to take light baggage, or,
as the witness expressed it, hand-satchels with them into the
state-room cabin.
When a passenger pays in addition for a separate or private
room, or, as it is called, a state-room, in the boats, he does so
to get greater and better accommodation, and for the privacy
and security which it affords. If he has simply with him a
valise, a small portable article coming under the denomination
of light baggage, as it may be carried in the hand, and from
its limited size -usually admits of little less than the clothing
and toilet articles required for present use, he has the right,
where such is the general character of its contents, to take it
with him into the chamber provided for him and where he is to
pass the night, and having placed it there and locked the door,
the obligation is upon the carrier to see that his property is
not purloined or stolen. Any regulation, the effect of which
would be to prevent him from doing this, would be unreasonable. It is essential to the traveler's convenience and comfort,
and the law would not descend into the particularity of insisting that he should open the valise, and taking out of it exactly
what was requisite for the night, lock it up and then take it
and deposit it in the baggage-room for safe keeping.
It might put him to considerable inconvenience if he had
to do this, and in this case the passenger had scarcely time to
do it, for he put the valise in the state-room and left for five
minutes to bid his sister good-bye, and when he returned itwas
gone. In fact it disappeared so quickly as scarcely to afford
him time even to see or read the rules and regulations alleged
to have been posted up, with which he was required to conform.
Judgment affirmed.

